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Money Spending or Money 
Laundering: The Fine Line 
between Legal and Illegal 
Financial Transactions 
 
Matthew R. Auten* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The essence of “[m]oney laundering is the process of 
changing money gained from illegal operations into a 
manageable form while concealing its illicit origins.”1 “Money 
laundering” is a relatively new term,2 as is the notion that 
money laundering is a crime.3 In 1986, the United States 
criminalized money laundering with passage of the Money 
Laundering Control Act.4 The new law reflected Congress’s 
desire to punish individuals whose financial activities 
concealed the existence, size, and scope of major drug 
smuggling and organized crime rings.5 When money laundering 
 
  * J.D. Candidate, Pace University School of Law (2013); B.A., McGill 
University (2002). The Author wishes to thank his wife Meghan, his parents 
Don and Judy Auten, and the entire Purvis family (including Robby and Max) 
for their boundless love, support, and patience, and the faculty and staff of 
Pace Law School for the commitment to excellence in education. 
1. STAFF OF S. CAUCUS ON INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL, 100TH CONG., 
LEGISLATION AIMED AT COMBATING INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKING AND 
MONEY LAUNDERING 13 (Comm. Print 1987). 
2. The term “money laundering” was apparently coined by United States 
law enforcement officials and entered the popular lexicon during the 
Watergate scandal in the mid-1970s. WILLIAM C. GILMORE, DIRTY MONEY: THE 
EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL MEASURES TO COUNTER MONEY LAUNDERING 
AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM 20 (3d ed. 2004). 
3. Kern Alexander, US Anti-Money Laundering Law: Background and 
Overview, in BUTTERWORTH’S INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO MONEY LAUNDERING 
LAW AND PRACTICE 630 (Toby Graham ed., 2d ed. 2003). 
4. Pub. L. No. 99-570, §§ 1351-52, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57 (2006)). 
5. See Scott Sultzer, Money Laundering: The Scope of the Problem and 
Attempts to Combat It, 63 TENN. L. REV. 143, 145-47 (1995). 
1
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was criminalized, drug trafficking was considered to be the 
world’s most serious crime problem.6 
However, the Money Laundering Control Act did not solely 
target professional money launderers.7 Instead, Congress 
crafted a broad statute designed to criminalize the actions of 
anyone who knowingly participated in an illicit transaction, 
regardless of its magnitude or dollar value.8 
Although the current money laundering statue is broad, 
there is widespread agreement that it does not criminalize the 
mere act of spending money generated by illegal criminal 
activity.9 In other words, spending money by making a 
purchase or entering into a transaction is not necessarily a 
crime, even if the party spending the illegally gained money 
knows that the money came from illegal activities. Rather, in 
order to run afoul of the law, there must be direct or 
circumstantial evidence showing that a transaction using the 
illegal funds was made with an intent to “conceal or disguise 
the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the 
control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity,”10 or to 
“avoid a transaction reporting requirement.”11 
There is often a fine line between legal transactions that 
amount to no more than money spending and illegal 
transactions designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise; 
and it is difficult to distinguish between the two. The issue 
often boils down to how the transaction is “characterized” by a 
finder of fact and whether enough evidence exists to support 
the fact finder’s characterization. Put another way, the 
challenge is determining whether the evidence demonstrates a 
transaction was entered into with the requisite mens rea. The 
 
6. STAFF OF S. CAUCUS ON INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL, supra note 1, at 1. 
7. Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1352, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986). 
8. 132 CONG. REC. 3827 (1986). 
9. See, e.g., United States v. Dvorak, 617 F.3d 1017, 1022 (8th Cir. 2010); 
United States v. Law, 528 F.3d 888, 895-96 (D.C. Cir. 2008); United States v. 
Hall, 434 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Marshall, 248 F.3d 525, 
538-39 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Stephenson, 183 F.3d 110, 120 (2d 
Cir. 1999); United States v. Willey, 57 F.3d 1374, 1385 (5th Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 842 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Sanders, 928 F.2d 940, 946 (10th Cir. 1991). 
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (2006). 
11. Id. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/8
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“characterization challenge” is compounded by the fact that 
money laundering cases typically rely on circumstantial 
evidence to establish that a transaction was designed with an 
intent to conceal. The challenge is best exemplified by cases in 
which money laundering charges are based on an underlying 
transaction whose purpose, on its face, could either be to obtain 
an immediate personal benefit, or to conceal some element of 
the criminal nature of the funds.12 
In this Article, I will examine the history of legislative 
efforts to combat money laundering in the United States, 
including the intent and purpose of the Money Laundering 
Control Act 1986.13 I will then analyze how courts have 
 
12. I will refer to transactions that could easily serve either a legal or 
illegal purpose as “dual-purpose” transactions. 
13. Within the anti-money laundering statutes, Congress has defined 
two types of money laundering that are often referred to as “promotional” and 
“concealment” money laundering. 
 
Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial 
transaction represents the proceeds of some form of 
unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a 
financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of 
specified unlawful activity-- 
(A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of 
specified unlawful activity; or (ii) with intent to 
engage in conduct constituting a violation of section 
7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; 
or 
(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in 
whole or in part-- 
(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the 
location, the source, the ownership, or the 
control of the proceeds of specified 
unlawful activity; or 
(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting 
requirement under State or Federal law, 
shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or 
twice the value of the property , whichever is greater, or 
imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both. For 
purposes of this paragraph, a financial transaction shall be 
considered to be one involving the proceeds of specified 
unlawful activity if it is part of a set of parallel or dependent 
transactions, any one of which involves the proceeds of 
specified unlawful activity, and all of which are part of a 
3
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addressed the challenge of characterizing dual-purpose 
transactions by developing factors whose presence may show 
that a transaction was entered into with an intent to conceal. 
In addition to providing an analysis of several cases where 
courts grappled with the challenges of characterizing dual-
purpose transactions, I will also examine the development of a 
“heightened” evidentiary standard that is often applied to 
scrutinize whether sufficient evidence exits to characterize a 
dual-purpose transaction as money laundering rather than 
money spending. Finally, I will make recommendations for 
minimizing the challenges of characterizing dual-purpose 
transactions. 
 
II. Legislative History 
 
Money laundering is often referred to as the “lifeblood” of 
organized crime, because it allows criminal enterprises to store, 
transport, and spend the profits of their illegal activities, while 
also concealing their existence, size, and scope from law 
enforcement agencies.14 However, the act of money laundering 
itself was not criminalized until passage of the Money 
Laundering Control Act in 1986.15 Before that time, law 
enforcement agencies still investigated money laundering,16 
 
single plan or arrangement. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (2006). Therefore, the defining characteristic of 
“promotional” money laundering is an intent to facilitate the carrying on of 
an unlawful activity, whereas “concealment” money laundering is 
distinguished by an intent to hide the nature, location, source, ownership, or 
control of illegal proceeds. After the initial overview, I will focus exclusively 
on issues involving “concealment” money laundering as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 
1956(a)(1)(B). 
14. Letter from Irving R. Kaufman, Chairman, President’s Comm’n on 
Organized Crime, to Honorable Ronald Reagan, President of the U.S. (1984) 
(introducing PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE CASH 
CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND MONEY 
LAUNDERING (1984) [hereinafter THE CASH CONNECTION]). 
15. Pub. L. No. 99-570, §§ 1351-52, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57 (2006)). 
16. See, e.g., Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary on S.J. Res. 
233: A Joint Resolution to Authorize the President’s Commission on Organized 
Crime to Compel the Attendance and Testimony of Witnesses and the 
Production of Information, 98th Cong. 100 (1984) (statement of Francis M. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/8
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since the strategy of “following the money” has long been an 
important law enforcement tactic,17 but before money 
laundering was criminalized, the “follow the money” strategy 
was only a roadmap for discovering underlying criminal 
enterprises, or as evidence of tax evasion, or other regulatory 
crimes.18 In fact, before money laundering itself was 
criminalized, the Bank Secrecy Act, which requires banks to 
report domestic currency transactions in excess of $10,000,19 
was the primary statute used to charge criminals with what 
would now be called money laundering.20 
By the early 1980s, the size and scope of the money 
laundering problem made it clear that the United States 
needed new measures to close existing loopholes in the Bank 
Secrecy Act.21 One goal in creating a new statutory regime was 
to enable law enforcement to disrupt the money pipeline that 
funded massive organized crime and drug trafficking 
operations.22 Although traditional criminal activities like loan-
sharking, illegal gambling, fraud, and bribery required money 
laundering to cleanse their illicit proceeds; it was the major 
drug trafficking organizations—who laundered billions of 
dollars in cash—that supplied the strongest impetus for the 
new money laundering law.23 
As the value of the illegal drug trade grew during the 
1960s and 1970s, money laundering became more lucrative and 
 
Mullen, Jr., Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration) [hereinafter 
Mullen Statement]. 
17. R.T. NAYLOR, FOLLOW-THE-MONEY: METHODS IN CRIME CONTROL 
POLICY 8-9 (1999), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/nathanson/washout.html. 
18. See Mullen Statement, supra note 16, at 100; Sultzer, supra note 5, 
at 152. 
19. Act of Oct. 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 91–508, 84 Stat. 1114-24 (1970); see 
also THE CASH CONNECTION, supra note 14, at 8-9 (explaining the 
shortcomings and loopholes of the Bank Secrecy Act). 
20. STAFF OF S. CAUCUS ON INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL, supra note 1, at 14. 
21. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, ORGANIZED CRIME AND 
MONEY LAUNDERING 165 (1984) (containing statement of John M. Walker Jr. 
to Commission). 
22. See Exec. Order No. 12,435, 48 Fed. Reg. 34,723 (July 28, 1983); 
STAFF OF S. CAUCUS ON INT’L NARCOTICS CONTROL, supra note 1, at 16. 
23. THE CASH CONNECTION, supra note 14, at 7; NAYLOR, supra note 17, 
at 6. 
5
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increasingly sophisticated.24 By the 1980s, the Western world 
was awash in narcotics.25 Along with the rise of foreign cartels 
and increasing participation by the mafia in the illegal drug 
trade,26 a new class of criminal emerged: the professional 
money launderer.27 These criminals, who often had a white-
collar background,28 were detached from the underlying 
criminal activity that generated the operations illegal income, 
and instead focused solely on the means and methods of 
performing money laundering transactions.29 
In response to the growing role of money laundering in 
financing high-profile criminal organizations, President 
Reagan formed an advisory commission to study the issue, to 
recommend reforms to close existing loopholes, and to give law 
enforcement new tools to cutoff the lifeblood of organized 
criminal organizations.30 Through passage of the Money 
Laundering Control Act, Congress took aim at those whose 
financial expertise enabled criminal networks to operate 
efficiently and thereby increase their profitability.31 
Additionally, the new law enabled law enforcement to 
strategically attack criminal organizations by targeting their 
cash reserves and undermining the financing of their 
operations.32 However, in approving the Money Laundering 
Control Act, Congress was not merely concerned with the big 
fish and financial whizzes who laundered millions of dollars. 
 
24. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 21, at v; 
Sultzer, supra note 5, at 147. 
25. NAYLOR, supra note 17, at 9. 
26. Id. 
27. Sultzer, supra note 5, at 158; PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON ORGANIZED 
CRIME, supra note 21, at 8; see also GILMORE, supra note 2, at 42. 
28. Alexander, supra note 3, at 628. 
29. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 21, at 80-83 
(containing statement of Special Agent Edward Gillen to Commission); 
Sultzer, supra note 5, at 147. 
30. See Exec. Order No. 12,435, 48 Fed. Reg. 34,723 (1983); Legislation 
to Grant Additional Power to the President's Comm'n on Organized Crime, 7 
Op. O.L.C. 128 (proposed Aug. 24, 1983). 
31. Jimmy Gurule, The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986: Creating 
A New Federal Offense or Merely Affording Federal Prosecutors an Alternative 
Means of Punishing Specified Unlawful Activity?, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 823, 
825 (1995). 
32. See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 21,at 161. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/8
  
2013] MONEY SPENDING OR MONEY LAUNDERING 1237 
Rather, as one Congressman stated at the time, the goal was 
to: 
 
let the whole community, the whole population, 
know they are part of the problem and they could 
very well be convicted of it if they knowingly take 
these funds. If we can make the drug dealers’ 
money worthless, then we have really struck a 
chord . . . . [Y]ou have outstanding business 
people who are otherwise totally moral who are 
accepting these funds and profiting greatly from 
drug trafficking . . . and this will put a stop to 
it.33 
 
In other words, the Money Laundering Control Act created a 
net designed to catch both sharks and minnows. 
 
III.  Distinguishing Money Laundering from Money Spending 
 
As a result of Congress’s decision to criminalize all money 
laundering, regardless of the size or scope of the transaction in 
question, money laundering charges have arisen in a myriad of 
different circumstances, and courts have had ample 
opportunities to interpret the meaning of the statute.34 One 
area of interpretation where there is widespread agreement 
among courts and commentators is that the Money Laundering 
Control Act did not criminalize the mere spending of money 
earned through illegal means.35 However, there is often a 
 
33. 132 CONG. REC. 3827 (1986). 
34. See, e.g., United States v. Shepard, 396 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(contractor fraud on gas pipeline project); United States v. Villarini, 238 F.3d 
530 (4th Cir. 2001) (bank employee embezzlement); United States v. Dobbs, 
63 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 1995) (illegal sale of cattle); see also United States v. 
Hall, 434 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2006) (personal loans, real estate purchases, and 
transfers to construction company used as a front); United States v. 
Marshall, 248 F.3d 525 (6th Cir. 2001) (Rolex watch, fine wine, and tennis 
bracelet); United States v. Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d 1469 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(land, an insurance investment, a pickup truck, and Paso Fine riding horses). 
35. See United States v. Dvorak, 617 F.3d 1017, 1022 (8th Cir. 2010); 
United States v. Law, 528 F.3d 888, 895-96 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Hall, 434 F.3d at 
50; Marshall, 248 F.3d at 538-39; United States v. Stephenson, 183 F.3d 110, 
7
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narrow distinction between legal financial transactions that 
only evince an intent to spend the proceeds of illegal activity, 
and financial transactions that are designed—in whole or in 
part—to launder the money and conceal the underlying illegal 
activity that generated the funds in question. 
Since money laundering is not the equivalent of money 
spending,36 the question for the courts was what distinguishes 
one from the other? Or, put another way, what kind of evidence 
can be relied upon to characterize a transaction as either 
money spending or money laundering? 
The characterization challenge is best illustrated through 
cases where money laundering has been charged for a dual-
purpose transaction. Dual-purpose transactions are especially 
tricky to characterize because, objectively, they often have the 
simultaneous effect of providing immediate personal benefits 
and concealing or disguising the source or nature of the funds 
used in the transaction. 
To illustrate the characterization challenges that dual-
purpose transactions pose, imagine a criminal who uses the 
proceeds of his criminal acts to purchase a massive diamond 
ring for his wife, acquire a car for his son, and open a bank 
account in his daughter’s name. Each of these transactions 
provides immediate personal benefits to the criminal and his 
family members, but each could also have the effect of 
laundering the proceeds of the criminal’s activities. How does a 
fact-finder, prosecutor, or court determine whether the purpose 
of these transactions was benevolent? When is the evidence 
sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
transactions were undertaken with the requisite mens rea for 
money laundering? 
To determine whether sufficient evidence to support a 
conviction for money laundering has been produced by the 
prosecution, the most clear-cut cases rely on probative 
 
120 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Willey, 57 F.3d 1374, 1385 (5th Cir. 
1995); United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 842 (7th Cir. 1991). 
36. Dvorak, 617 F.3d at 1022; Law, 528 F.3d at 895-96; Hall, 434 F.3d at 
50; Marshall, 248 F.3d at 538-39; Stephenson, 183 F.3d at 120; Willey, 57 
F.3d at 1385; Jackson, 935 F.2d at 842; United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 
940, 946 (10th Cir. 1991). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/8
  
2013] MONEY SPENDING OR MONEY LAUNDERING 1239 
statements made by the defendant.37 Direct evidence of this 
kind is often obtained through wiretaps,38 or through the 
testimony of co-conspirators.39 However, more often than not, 
the prosecution relies on circumstantial evidence—often with 
the interpretive help of an expert witness—to make their case 
that a dual-purpose transaction should be characterized as 
money laundering.40 In some instances, circumstantial 
evidence may provide a clear inference that a particular dual-
purpose transaction, or series of transactions, should be 
characterized as money laundering, because the intent to 
conceal is clear.41 For example, in cases where there is evidence 
of “numerous transfers, multiple accounts, fictitious accounts, 
or the use of third-parties,” before the dual-purpose purchase is 
made, there is ample evidence of a defendant’s intent to conceal 
and thus evidentiary support to characterize the transaction as 
money laundering.42 
Given the diversity of crimes that may lead to money 
laundering charges, the endless ways criminals seek to launder 
money, and the importance of the context in which these 
actions are taken, there is no definitive list of acts that are 
 
37. See Stephenson, 183 F.3d at 120 (“There was ample evidence that the 
money in the safe deposit box was the fruit of . . . [the] drug transactions and 
that Antoinette placed it there as his direction so as to conceal it. Indeed, he 
was recorded saying just that . . . .”); see also Hall, 434 F.3d at 54 (“There was 
testimony that Hall said that he established Fire Island Construction 'to 
make him look legitimate' and that he transferred construction equipment to 
Fire Island as part of a scheme to 'clean up some [of the] money.”); United 
States v. Manarite, 44 F.3d 1407, 1410 (9th Cir. 1995) (confidential informant 
asked Defendants to participate in money laundering scheme involving 
casino chips that were allegedly skimmed by a casino employee); United 
States v. Monea, 376 F. App’x 531, 533 (6th Cir. 2010) (Defendant told 
undercover FBI agent “that he had a lot of money that he needed to move into 
legitimate businesses.”) (unpublished opinion). 
38. See, e.g., Stephenson, 183 F.3d at 113. 
39. See, e.g., Monea, 376 F. App’x at 539. 
40. See generally Thomas M. DiBiagio, Money Laundering and Drug 
Trafficking: A Question of Understanding the Elements of the Crime and the 
Use of Circumstantial Evidence, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 255, 272-74 (1994). 
41. See, e.g., United States v. Omoruyi, 260 F.3d 291, 296 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(“[I]nasmuch as the money was deposited in bank accounts under false 
names, and Omoruyi used false identification to withdraw it, he clearly 
conducted the transactions charged with the intent to conceal or disguise the 
nature, source, ownership and control of the proceeds of the mail fraud.”). 
42. United States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir. 2006). 
9
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probative of an intent to “conceal or disguise the nature, the 
location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the 
proceeds of specified unlawful activity.”43 Nevertheless, a 
number of courts have embraced a non-exhaustive list of 
actions that are probative of an intent to conceal, and thus 
evidence that the actions were undertaken with the necessary 
mens rea for criminal money laundering.44 Perhaps the best 
known and widely used list of probative factors was compiled 
by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in United States 
v. Garcia-Emanuel.45 
 
[The factors] include, among others, statements 
by a defendant probative of intent to conceal; 
unusual secrecy surrounding the transaction; 
structuring the transaction in a way to avoid 
attention; depositing illegal profits in the bank 
account of a legitimate business; highly irregular 
features of the transaction; using third parties to 
conceal the real owner; a series of unusual 
financial moves cumulating in the transaction; or 
expert testimony on practices of criminals.46 
 
When courts are asked to decide whether a given set of 
facts are sufficient to establish or sustain a charge of money 
laundering, the issue is often raised by a motion made at 
trial,47 although occasionally the issue is raised for the first 
time on appeal.48 In either event, once the issue moves to 
appeal following a conviction, the evidence must be viewed in a 
light most favorable to the government, although because the 
proceedings are criminal in nature, the underlying facts must 
have been sufficient to establish a defendant’s guilt beyond a 
 
43. 18 U.S.C § 1956 (a)(1)(B)(i) (2006). 
44. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 658 F.3d 333, 340 (3d Cir. 
2011); United States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Marshall, 248 F.3d 525, 539 (6th Cir. 2001). 
45. 14 F.3d 1469 (10th Cir. 1994). 
46. Id. at 1475-76 (internal citations omitted). 
47. See, e.g., Richardson, 658 F.3d at 337. 
48. See, e.g., United States v. Esterman, 324 F.3d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 
2003). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/8
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reasonable doubt.49 
 
IV. Approaches to Characterizing Dual-Purpose Transactions 
 
A. The Foundational Cases 
 
One of the first cases to address the challenge of 
characterizing dual-purpose transactions was United States v. 
Sanders.50 Johnny Lee Sanders was indicted for his 
involvement in a heroin distribution ring, and of the forty-one 
counts against him, several were for violating federal money 
laundering statutes.51 Two of the money laundering charges, 
which were also leveled at Sanders’s wife, stemmed from the 
couple’s purchase of an automobile using the proceeds of 
Johnny Lee’s illegal activities.52 The Sanders’ were convicted by 
a jury at trial, but their money laundering convictions were 
nullified by a post-trial motion.53 On appeal, the government 
first argued that the money laundering statute should be 
interpreted broadly to encompass “all transactions, however 
ordinary on their face, which involve the proceeds of unlawful 
activity.”54 However, the Tenth Circuit held that money 
laundering was not the same as “money spending . . . .”55 
As an alternative to their statutory interpretation 
argument, the government also insisted that the “concealment” 
requirement had been proven because the car was titled in 
their daughter’s name, because the Sanders signed documents 
in their daughter’s name, and because the car was paid for in 
cash.56 However, the court held that despite the car being titled 
in the name of a third-person,57 the fact that the Sanders’ 
daughter came to the car dealership after the sale, that she 
shared the couple’s last name, and that the car was 
 
49. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970). 
50. 928 F.2d 940 (10th Cir. 1991). 
51. Id. at 942. 
52. Id. at 944-45. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 946. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. This was allegedly done for insurance purposes. See id. 
11
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conspicuously used by the couple after the purchase 
necessitated overturning their convictions.58 Essentially the 
court found that evidence presented could not establish that 
the car purchase was a means of concealing the illegal proceeds 
of Johnny Lee’s criminal activities.59 
In 1994, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
revisited Sanders and the challenge of characterizing dual-
purpose transactions.60 A jury convicted Mario Garcia-Emanuel 
on drug, tax evasion, and money laundering charges, but he 
was granted a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. 
Pro. 29(c) on all money laundering charges.61 Both sides 
appealed. 62 At the Court of Appeals, Garcia-Emanuel’s 
conviction was reinstated on five counts of money laundering, 
while a judgment of acquittal was upheld on twelve others. For 
this article, the court’s handling of counts Fourteen and Fifteen 
are most significant.63 Counts Fourteen and Fifteen stemmed 
from two separate purchases of Paso Fino horses by Garcia-
Emanuel and his wife.64 The conviction based on one purchase 
was reinstated, while a judgment of acquittal was affirmed on 
the other.65 
Garcia-Emanuel and his wife had a hobby of raising Paso 
Fino horses.66 Therefore, “while a horse in some instances could 
be essentially an investment, there was a significant aspect of 
present personal benefit in this case.”67 The court described 
these counts as “borderline cases”68 where “our requirement 
that the jury verdicts of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt be 
based on substantial evidence, and not mere suspicion, becomes 
paramount.”69 
 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. See United States v. Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d 1469, 1471-72 (10th 
Cir. 1994). 
61. Id. at 1472. 
62. Id. 
63. See id. at 1477-78. 
64. Id. at 1477. 
65. Id. at 1477-78. 
66. Id. at 1477. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 1475 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/8
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In Count Fourteen, a large payment on the horse was 
made in cash and the Garcia-Emanuel’s orally represented to 
the seller of the horse the cash for the purchase came from 
their restaurant.70 However, evidence at trial showed that the 
cash had come from illegal activities.71 To counter the inference 
that these facts revealed the requisite mens rea, the Garcia-
Emanuels’ introduced evidence that exchanging cash for horses 
was a normal practice within the trade, that the contract for 
the horse was negotiated in the husband’s name, that the 
restaurant was not used as a remitter or named party in the 
transaction, and that no attempt was made to leave a paper 
trail that would lead an investigator to believe the money came 
from any source other than Garcia-Emanuel.72 Therefore, the 
court held that mere facts of the all-cash purchase and a single 
false comment about the source of the funds were insufficient 
evidence upon which a jury could find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the transaction could be characterized as money 
laundering.73 Rather, the court found that, under the 
circumstances, the all-cash transaction and single false 
comment did not amount to “substantial evidence” of an intent 
to conceal.74 
Count Fifteen of Garcia-Emanuel’s indictment involved 
nearly the same circumstances as Count Fourteen, but in this 
instance the money laundering conviction was reinstated.75 
Count Fifteen involved another purchase of a Paso Fino horse, 
but in this transaction, Ms. Garcia-Emanuel purchased the 
horse in her husband’s name using a $20,000 check drawn on 
their joint checking account.76 However, in the week prior to 
the purchase of the horse, three cash deposits of $7000, $8000, 
and $8000 were made into the joint account.77 Although the 
court noted that bank deposits structured to avoid the $10,000 
currency reporting requirements are criminalized under 
 
70. Id. at 1477. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 1478. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
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another section of the money laundering statute,78 the court 
nevertheless held that the temporal proximity of the 
transactions presented sufficient evidence upon which a jury 
could reasonably have concluded that the horse purchase was 
designed, in whole or in part, with an intent to conceal.79 The 
divergent results between these two nearly identical 
transactions illustrates the fine line between money laundering 
and money spending. 
 
B. Concealment in the Underlying Criminal Activity 
 
In United States v. Dobbs and United States v. Shoff, the 
Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eighth Circuits helped to 
clarify the difference between money spending and money 
laundering.80 Shoff was convicted of fraud for running an 
investment Ponzi scheme and of money laundering for using 
proceeds from his scam to purchase two cars.81 The government 
argued that “concealment–that is, not telling the victim what is 
really going on–is an essential feature of all schemes to 
defraud. . . . [Therefore] all schemes to defraud people of money 
. . . include an element of money laundering.”82 
However, the court held that although 
 
Shoff certainly concealed [from his victims] the 
fact that he was converting all their money[;] . . . 
. the open manner in which he used some of the 
proceeds to purchase two cars was no more 
designed to help conceal this fraud than the fact 
that he spent most of the rest of the proceeds at 
casinos to finance his fondness for gambling.83 
 
Therefore, the mere fact that committing a fraud necessarily 
 
78. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2006). 
79. Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d at 1478. 
80. See United States v. Dobbs, 63 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Shoff, 151 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 1998). 
81. Shoff, 151 F.3d at 890-91. 
82. Id. at 891. 
83. Id. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/8
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requires an element of concealment is not sufficient to show 
that a subsequent transaction using proceeds of the fraud to 
purchase personal items also evinced the same intent to 
conceal. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached the 
same result in United States v. Dobbs.84 Dobbs was convicted of 
fraud and two counts of money laundering for a scheme 
involving illicit sales of cattle.85 One money laundering count 
showed Dobbs deposited the proceeds of an illicit cattle sale 
into his wife’s bank account and then used the account to pay 
family and ranching expenses.86 The second count found that 
Dobbs converted a $37,000 cattle sale check into four cashier’s 
checks that were subsequently used to pay for family and 
ranching expenses.87 Although the government argued that 
Dobbs’s refusal to disclose these transactions to his bank and 
his bankruptcy attorney was evidence of intent to conceal the 
source of the funds, the court held that the evidence presented 
only demonstrated Dobbs was involved in fraudulent activity, 
and thereafter spent the proceeds, without the requisite 
attempt to conceal that is necessary for a money laundering 
conviction.88 Critically, the court noted that third-parties were 
not used in this scheme, that Dobbs typically used his wife’s 
bank account as the ranch’s main operational account, and that 
the transactions themselves were “open and notorious—at least 
as much as typical bank transactions can be.”89 Therefore, the 
element of concealment from the fraud could not be “attached” 
to the subsequent money spending transactions. 
Two years later, in United States v. Tencer, the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit clarified that their holding in 
Dobbs did not stand for the proposition that money laundering 
charges could be avoided in the event of a fraud just because a 
criminal conducted banking transactions with the fraud 
proceeds in their own name.90 Tencer was convicted of mail 
 
84. United States v. Dobbs, 63 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 1995). 
85. Id. at 393-94. 
86. Id. at 397. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 398. 
89. Id. at 397. 
90. United States v. Tencer, 107 F.3d 1120, 1130-31 (5th Cir. 1997). 
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fraud and money laundering for his role in a scheme to defraud 
several insurance companies.91 In the three years before being 
indicted, Tencer opened numerous bank accounts across the 
country using his own name.92 Once indicted, Tencer directed 
those banks to transmit his funds to an address in Louisiana at 
which he neither lived nor worked.93 The cashier’s checks were 
then used to open a new bank account in Las Vegas, where 
Tencer informed the bank employees that he was “moving into 
the area and needed cash to buy a business.”94 He also directed 
several banks, which had not yet mailed his deposits to 
Louisiana, to wire the money to his new Las Vegas account 
instead.95 Tencer then sought to have the balance of his Las 
Vegas account, an amount exceeding $1,000,000, delivered to 
him, in cash, at a local airport.96 
On appeal, Tencer argued the evidence supporting his 
money laundering convictions was insufficient because he 
never used third-parties and his actions created a clear paper 
trail connecting him to the bank transactions.97 The 
government countered by arguing that using a false identity or 
third-party is not essential to a money laundering conviction, 
where other evidence clearly shows an intent to conceal.98 The 
 
91. Id. at 1124-25. 
92. Id. at 1128. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 1129. 
98. If a third-party or false identity is used in the course of an alleged 
money laundering scheme, courts have found that evidence goes to the heart 
of the statute’s intent to criminalize concealment and have been quick to 
affirm convictions on those grounds. See United States v. Willey, 57 F.3d 
1374, 1385 (5th Cir. 1995) (explaining that “simply spending money in one’s 
own name will generally not support a money laundering conviction, using a 
third party, for example a business entity or relative, to purchase goods on 
one’s behalf or from which one will benefit usually constitutes sufficient proof 
of a design to conceal.”); see also United States v. Graham, 125 F. App’x 624, 
631 (6th Cir. 2005) (affirming conviction for conspiracy where defendant 
knew drug-dealing money launderer, although physically present when a 
vehicle was purchased in a third-persons name, “intentionally concealed his 
own legal identity from any of the activities or documentation and concealed 
that he provided the money for the down payment, trade-in, or balance 
financed.”) (unpublished opinion). 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/8
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court agreed, finding Tencer’s request that funds be sent to an 
address at which he neither worked nor resided, his use of a 
Las Vegas bank hundreds of miles away from his home and 
business to consolidate funds, and his false statements to bank 
employees about his plans to move to the area were sufficient 
to support his convictions.99 In addition, although the court did 
not dwell on this point in its analysis, it should be noted that a 
distinguishing factor between Tencer and Dobbs is that Dobbs 
spent the fraudulently obtained funds for immediate personal 
benefit, while Tencer evidently did not.100 Although the court 
did not speculate about whether Tencer’s conviction would 
have been affirmed had he used the proceeds of his illegal 
activities for a dual-purpose transaction, it is safe to assume 
that the existence of such evidence would have made the 
decision to affirm his conviction a much closer call. 
 
C. Two Mischaracterized Dual-Purpose Transactions 
 
 In contrast to Dobbs, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit found sufficient evidence to uphold a 
money laundering conviction in United States v. Villarini, on 
facts that were essentially analogous.101 However, no clear split 
between the circuits emerged since the money laundering 
convictions against Villarini were vacated on other grounds.102 
Villarini, a former bank employee in Roanoke, Virginia, was 
charged with embezzling $83,000 from her employer by 
overstating the amount of mutilated cash she had under her 
control during her employment, and then cashing out that 
amount on her final day as a bank employee.103 After leaving 
the bank, Villarini decamped for Florida so she could live near 
 
99. Tencer, 107 F.3d at 1128. 
100. In Tencer the court mentions Dobbs’s use of the funds “for family 
and business expenses” several times but does specify its level of importance. 
See Tencer, 107 F.3d at 1128-29. 
101. Compare United States v. Villarini, 238 F.3d 530 (4th Cir. 2001), 
with United States v. Dobbs, 63 F.3d 391, 393-94 (5th Cir. 1995). 
102. See Villarini, 238 F.3d at 537 (concluding the government’s 
evidence was sufficient to support money laundering convictions, but 
vacating those convictions because the venue was improper). 
103. Id. at 532. 
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her daughter.104 After arriving in Florida, Villarini purchased a 
cashier’s check to cover her moving expenses and opened a new 
checking and savings accounts.105 Villarini made several small 
deposits into the bank account over a two month period “to 
cover her living expenses.”106 
According to the Court: 
 
the fact that Villarini did not deposit the entire 
$83,000 in a single bank transaction, and instead 
made four transactions, each involving less than 
$3,000, at two-to-four week intervals, gives rise 
to a reasonable inference that the transactions 
were designed to avoid suspicion or to give the 
appearance that she had a legitimate cash 
income stream.107 
 
As in Garcia-Emanuel, the court here once again noted that a 
separate statutory provision exists to punish bank deposits 
that are designed to avoid currency reporting requirements.108 
However, the court cited Garcia-Emanuel to support its 
conclusion that Villarini’s actions were sufficient to support her 
money laundering conviction.109 In this instance, Garcia-
Emanuel may have been wrongly applied, and as a result, the 
court may have erred in its conclusion that the evidence was 
sufficient to characterize the transaction as money laundering 
as opposed to money spending.110 
 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 533. 
108. See id. at 532 (noting the purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) is 
to punish transactions to avoid currency reporting requirements). See also 
United States v. Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d 1469 (10th Cir. 1994). 
109. Villarini, 238 F.3d at 533 (citing Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d at 1478). 
110. Villarini is thus clearly distinguishable from the bizarre case of 
United States v. Dvorak, where a money laundering conviction was affirmed 
solely on the basis of cash withdrawals that the defendant made from his 
bank account. Compare Villarini, 238 F.3d at 530, with United States v. 
Dvorak, 617 F.3d 1017, 1021-24 (8th Cir. 2010). In Dvorak, the conviction 
was affirmed on the grounds that several days after depositing fraudulent 
checks, the defendant would withdraw the entire balance of the account in 
cash in order to liquefy the funds so as to conceal their location. Dvorak, 617 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/8
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For example, Garcia-Emanuel is distinguishable from the 
facts of Villarini because Garcia-Emanuel deposited the illegal 
funds into his wife’s bank account, not his personal bank 
account. In addition, in Garcia-Emanuel, the deposited funds 
were subsequently used to purchase a single luxury item (a 
Paso Fino horse) that could have either been an investment 
and money laundering vehicle, or an item for personal use and 
benefit. By contrast Villarini deposited funds into her personal 
account to cover checks for her living expenses. The record does 
not indicate whether Villarini was required to write checks for 
her living expenses, such as rent or utility payments, but given 
the prosecution’s burden of establishing guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the burden should have rested with the 
prosecution to produce such evidence. In deciding Villarini, the 
Fourth Circuit apparently ignored Garcia-Emanuel’s directive 
to search for substantial evidence of an intent to conceal.111 
Additionally the court in Villarini also failed to consider a 
major theme of money laundering jurisprudence; namely that 
money laundering is not the same thing as money spending. As 
in Dobbs,112 Villarini’s transactions were as open and 
transparent as banking transactions can be, and therefore, the 
court should have found the evidence to be insufficient to 
support a money laundering conviction. 
In United States v. Shepard, the Tenth Circuit 
dramatically expanded the scope of what evidence can be 
sufficient to show that third-parties were used to launder 
money by concealing the source of the illegal funds.113 Shepard 
was a construction contractor convicted for his role in a scheme 
to bill clients for non-existent employees and equipment.114 Two 
of the money laundering counts Shepard was convicted of 
involved the depositing of fraudulent checks into the bank 
account of his daughter, Chastity Shepard.115 According to the 
 
F.3d at 1024. Therefore, whether he spent the funds for personal use or not 
was irrelevant to the court’s decision. Id. 
111. See Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d at 1475. 
112. See United States v. Dobbs, 63 F.3d 391, 397 (5th Cir. 1995). 
113. See United States v. Shepard, 396 F.3d 1116, 1118-19 (10th Cir. 
2005). 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 1122. 
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court, this fact alone was sufficient to satisfy the statute’s 
concealment requirement and characterize the transaction as 
money laundering.116 
In support of this proposition, the court cited United States 
v. Short and United States v. Stephenson, in which deposits 
made by a defendant’s wife into a safe deposit box were found 
to be probative of an intent to conceal.117 Both cases are 
distinguishable. For starters, both Short and Stephenson 
involved the use of safe deposit boxes, which are inherently 
more secretive, and subject to fewer reporting requirements, 
than a bank account.118 Furthermore, in Short, the defendant 
gave cash to his wife and instructed her to place the funds in a 
safe deposit box “under the name of one of her relatives.”119 
Therefore, the evidence in Short showed that the defendant put 
several layers of disguise between himself and the illegal 
funds, including holding the funds in a safe deposit box of 
someone who presumably did not share his last name. In 
Stephenson, the safe deposit box was placed in the name of the 
defendant’s wife, so there were fewer layers of deception.120 
However, all of the necessary probative evidence in Stephenson 
was provided by the defendant who was recorded on a wire-tap 
telling his wife to conceal the money by depositing it in the safe 
deposit box.121 
By contrast, in Shepard, the deposits were made into a 
regular bank account, the account holder was the defendant’s 
daughter who shared his last name, and there was no direct 
evidence of an intent to conceal. The issue of a common last 
name is important, because depositing funds into the account 
of a spouse or child, without more, is generally insufficient to 
support a conviction, while depositing funds into the account of 
a girlfriend has been found to be sufficient.122 The facts of 
 
116. Id. 
117. Id. (citing United States v. Short, 181 F.3d 620, 626 (5th Cir. 1999); 
United States v. Stephenson, 183 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
118. See Short, 181 F.3d at 626; Stephenson, 183 F.3d at 120. 
119. Short, 181 F.3d at 626 (emphasis added). 
120. Stephenson, 183 F.3d at 120. 
121. Id. 
122. Compare United States v. Bowman, 235 F.3d 1113, 1116 (8th Cir. 
2000) (“A design or intent to conceal the nature, the source, or the ownership 
of unlawfully obtained proceeds may be inferred when a defendant transfers 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/8
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Shepard are simply not “substantial” evidence of 
concealment.123 Under the facts of Shepard, where a deposit 
was made in the bank account of an immediate family member 
who shares the defendant’s last name, the government should 
have been required to produce more evidence of an intent to 
conceal in order to sustain the money laundering conviction.124 
 
D. Missed Opportunities to Avoid the Characterization  
 Problem 
 
In United States v. Richardson, the defendant was 
convicted of money laundering for using the proceeds of her 
boyfriend’s drug dealing operation to purchase a home in her 
own name.125 According to the government, Richardson lied 
about her income on a mortgage application and titled the 
home in her name alone, even though she knew her boyfriend 
Coles was the home’s true owner.126 In addition, the 
government produced evidence that Coles laundered money 
through a front business and engaged in an irregular series of 
bank deposits in the days and hours before the closing of the 
home purchase.127 
However, the court also found there was “precious little 
evidence” to show Richardson knew about structuring 
 
those proceeds into the control of others with whom the defendant has a very 
close relationship . . . . [I]n this case, the checking account of Mr. Bowman's 
girlfriend.”), with United States v. Corchado-Peralta, 318 F.3d 255, 259 (1st 
Cir. 2003) (“So far as we can tell, Corchado mostly did no more than make 
large regular deposits in an account given to her by her husband; there was 
no inference of concealment or disguise.”). 
123. It should also be noted that Shepard endorsed the check in his own 
name. United States v. Shepard, 396 F.3d 1116, 1122 (10th Cir. 2005). 
124. For example, in United States v. Warshak, a number of the charged 
transactions involved transfers to the defendant, family members bearing his 
surname, and to corporations in which defendant was the sole shareholder. 
631 F.3d 266, 320-21 (6th Cir. 2010). However, the government also produced 
evidence from an expert who found the transactions to be extremely 
complicated and voluminous which had the effect of commingling and 
concealing personal and business transactions. Id. at 321. 
125. United States v. Richardson, 658 F.3d 333, 335 (3d Cir. 2011). 
126. Id. at 341-42. 
127. Id. 
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transactions that preceded the home purchase.128 In fact, only 
one transaction–a deposit of $9200–could be connected to the 
defendant.129 Further, uncontradicted evidence showed that 
Richardson and Coles applied to have the home jointly titled in 
both of their names, but were dissuaded from doing so by their 
mortgage company who claimed they could not issue a loan to 
Coles due to his poor credit, but that Richardson could qualify 
on her own.130 
Notably, although the prosecution introduced evidence 
that five cash deposits of just less than $10,000 were made at 
four different banks on the day of the closing,131 Richardson 
was not charged with designing transactions to avoid bank 
currency reporting requirements under 18 U.S.C. § 
1956(a)(1)(B)(ii). Had Richardson been charged under this 
provision of the statute, the prosecution could have avoided the 
“characterization challenge” of this dual-purpose transaction, 
and since the government had evidence linking Richardson to a 
$9200 cash transaction, it is conceivable that they may have 
been able to produce enough evidence to sustain a conviction on 
this charge. 
 
IV. Recommendations 
 
Three recommendations stand out from the foregoing 
analysis of cases that explore the difference between money 
laundering and money spending. First, the bright light of direct 
evidence, such as recorded conversations obtained through a 
wiretap or the direct testimony of a co-conspirator, effectively 
turns transactions that would otherwise exist in the grey area 
between money spending and money laundering into clear-cut 
black and white cases. Although direct evidence may be 
difficult to obtain due to the budgetary or staff constraints, 
there is a clear advantage to obtaining such evidence. This is 
especially true for a prosecutor seeking a money laundering 
conviction based on a dual-purpose transaction that evinces 
 
128. Id. at 341. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 341-42. 
131. Id. at 341. 
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elements of both legal money spending and illegal money 
laundering. 
Second, there appears to be a tendency on behalf of 
prosecutors to charge suspects with money laundering under 
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), but not with conducting a financial 
transaction designed to avoid currency reporting requirements 
under § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii).132 As noted throughout this article, 
there have been several instances where defendants were not 
charged with avoiding currency reporting requirements, 
despite their apparently culpable conduct. Regardless of 
whether prosecutors decided to pursue Richardson, Villarini, 
and Garcia-Emanuel under § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) for sentencing 
purposes, or because of erroneous assumptions about the 
evidence they would be allowed to present at trial, prosecutors 
in future cases should ensure they make full use of currency 
reporting requirements when charging suspects. 
Third, when a money laundering charge requires 
characterization of a dual-purpose transaction, courts have 
been inclined, either explicitly or implicitly, to subject the 
prosecution’s evidence to an exacting review. In some 
instances, courts have articulated a “substantial evidence” 
requirement for characterizing dual-purpose transactions as 
money laundering. Although it is not entirely clear whether the 
use of that term poses a distinct and additional legal burden on 
the prosecution, or whether it is more of a rhetorical warning 
that the evidence in such cases will be closely scrutinized, the 
heightened focus is appropriate and should continue. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Money laundering is a relatively new crime that was 
formerly codified for the first time in 1986. Although the 
impetus for the new law was driven by public outrage at large-
scale money laundering operations of the mafia and foreign 
drug cartels, the final law approved by Congress criminalized 
money laundering regardless of its size or scale. As courts have 
grappled with the statute’s language, a widespread consensus 
 
132. See, e.g., Richardson, 658 F.3d at 333; United States v. Garcia-
Emanuel, 14 F.3d 1469 (10th Cir. 1994). 
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has emerged that the law does not criminalize the mere 
spending of the proceeds of illegal activity. However, there is 
often a fine line between transactions that merely represent 
money spending and money laundering transactions that 
evince intent to conceal the illegal nature of the funds being 
used in the transaction. The challenge is determining whether 
the evidence demonstrates that such transactions were 
undertaken with the requisite mens rea. 
There are three ways this legal gray area can be brought 
into sharper focus. First, prosecutors should focus on 
developing direct evidence that demonstrates a defendant’s 
intent to conceal. Second, prosecutors should ensure they make 
full use of the currency reporting provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 
1956. Finally, courts should continue to carefully scrutinize 
money laundering charges that are based on dual-purpose 
transactions to ensure money laundering convictions will only 
stand where the defendant’s culpable conduct has been proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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